Purpose -Accounting and water industry experts are developing general-purpose water accounting (GPWA) to report information about water and rights to water. The system has the potential to affect water policies, pricing and management, and investment and other decisions that are affected by GPWA report users' understanding of water risks faced by an entity. It may also affect financial returns to accounting and auditing firms and firms in water industries. In this paper the authors aim to examine the roles of the accounting profession, water industries and other stakeholders in governing GPWA. Recognising that the fate of GPWA depends partly upon regulatory power and economics, they seek to apply regulatory theories that explain financial accounting standards development to speculate about the national and international future of GPWA.
Introduction
Since 2007, Australia has been leading the world in the development of general purpose water accounting (GPWA) [1] . GPWA is designed to report information about water and rights to water to external parties who are otherwise unable to command that information from an entity, but who could be expected to need the information to make decisions about the allocation of resources (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2010) . Those resources may include, but are not limited to, resources that are economic, environmental or social in nature. For example, decisions might relate to whether to invest in a company that has exposure to operational risk due to water scarcity or flooding, water quality, or variability of either (economic); policy regarding allocation of water to the environment (environmental); or whether to relocate communities due to water scarcity, flooding or quality (social). If GPWA is to provide input to decisions of this significance, it is important that the system provides information that is presented in a manner that enables it to fulfil its purpose [2] .
The Water Accounting Standards Board (WASB), Australia's national water accounting standard setter, defines water accounting as "a systematic process of identifying, recognising, quantifying, reporting, and assuring information about water, the rights and other claims to that water, and the obligations against that water" (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009). In developing GPWA, the Board has drawn from financial accounting concepts, principles and practices (see www.bom.gov.au/water/standards). It has applied financial accounting methods of recording and reporting information to non-financial content: water volumes and quality, rather than financial values. Analogous to financial accounting's Statement of Cash Flows, Balance Sheet, and Income Statement are the GPWA Statement of Physical Flows of Water, Statement of Water Assets and Water Liabilities (introducing the notion of accruals because water assets include rights or claims to water as well as water itself), and the Statement of Changes in Water Assets and Water Liabilities (again, using an accrual concept). Together, these statements reveal how much water has been received into an entity (e.g. a catchment area, a mining company, a state or a water supplier) or left the entity and its source/destination [3] . They also reveal whether the water and rights to water held by an entity are currently sufficient to meet claims to water that the entity is obliged to honour. Finally, they reveal movements in both water and the rights to water. This information is likely to be useful in assessing risk associated with an entity by virtue of its association with water and rights or other claims to water (e.g. operating risk, environmental risk, or financial risk associated with water volumes, quality, or fluctuations in either).
The purpose of this paper is to provide an ex ante analysis of the potential for regulatory theories to explain alternative possible national and international institutional arrangements for water accounting. We also consider the implications of those arrangements. We acknowledge that in the early development phase of a system such as GPWA it is unlikely that a single theory of regulation can explain all developments. Indeed, different theories might apply at different times. Given that GPWA has been derived from financial reporting, we examine the explanatory potential for three regulatory theories -public interest, private interest, and regulatory capture -that have been applied to explain regulatory developments in relation to financial accounting (e.g. Walker, 1987; Collett et al., 2001) . While these theories can yield conflicting predictions, we suggest that this is not necessarily the case for GPWA.
In this paper we speculate about potential influences on the development of GPWA. The importance of these influences derives from the importance of water, itself, as a resource of variable volume and quality. It also derives from the importance of GPWA reports to the decisions of future GPWA report users. Furthermore, it derives from the consequences of regulatory arrangements for the generation and distribution of GPWA-related revenue streams to accounting and/or water industry professionals. As an early study in relation to a new and developing reporting system, this paper is exploratory and speculative in nature. We hope that it will guide future research in ways that will contribute to the value of GPWA as an information system that facilitates effective and efficient resource allocations.
Levels and variability of water quantity and quality are issues of major concern in many countries. In South Africa the issues involve water scarcity (Brulliard, 2009 ) and the toxicity of drinking water serving shanty towns and other low socio-economic communities (Bega, 2009) . Similar issues are demonstrated in parts of India (British Geological Survey, 2004) and South America (Goodman, 2009) . In Spain, controversy has surrounded desalination plant construction to manage water scarcity (Keeley, 2008) . United States (US) water policy has been described as fragmented with no real national water policy in place (Gerlak, 2005) , and severe drought threatens agriculture production in China (Branigan, 2009) . Likewise, during the first decade of the twenty-first century Australia experienced a drought which is thought to be one of the world's severest (Gleick, 2009 ). Subsequently, floods such as those occurring in Australia, Sri Lanka, Brazil and Indonesia during 2011 have demonstrated the need for information to plan for, or manage responses to, water abundance.
As a consequence of drought issues facing Australia, an intergovernmental agreement on a National Water Initiative (NWI) was signed at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) [4] meeting in 2004[5] . The NWI is a plan for the management of water resources to optimise economic, social and environmental outcomes. Subsequently, the Australian Government approved the $AUD12.9 billion water investment program "Water for the Future". This program aims to secure the long-term water supply for Australia.
Recognising that sound water management requires high quality and credible information, the Australian government also earmarked $AUD450m of the water investment program for improving the quality, comparability and availability of water information. According to one of Australia's leading business commentators, the most powerful driver of Australia's raft of water reform initiatives since 2004 is likely to be information that will be provided through water accounting (Kohler, 2009) . With these information improvements, parties involved in water resource planning and allocation should be better informed, leading to improved decisions.
GPWA is being developed to provide decision-making information helpful to report users who are otherwise unable to command the information reported [6] . It is also expected to assist managers as well as external stakeholders. According to the WASB, the reports emanating from the application of GPWA standards will be general purpose water accounting reports. While GPWA derives from a conceptual framework aligned with conceptual frameworks underpinning financial reporting standards development, it is developing very differently in practice from financial accounting. Financial reporting standard-setters are retro-fitting incomplete conceptual frameworks to international and national accounting standards. In contrast, GPWA is developing in a staged logical sequence commencing with the completion of a Water Accounting Conceptual Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009 ) and moving to development of standards based on that conceptual framework.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we consider the nature of Australian water management issues and reforms and we summarise the development of GPWA. Our purpose is to identify some of the past, current and future pressures on the development of GPWA. Then in section 3 we discuss how public interest, private interest, and regulatory capture theories of regulation can explain GPWA standard-setting developments. We do so partly by drawing parallels with experience in relation to financial accounting since the three regulatory theories have been analysed to explain much of the development and acceptance of financial accounting at national and international levels (e.g. Walker, 1987; Collett et al., 2001) . We contend that forces contributing to a regulatory capture of water accounting standard-setting will facilitate its global evolution and that this capture is likely to serve the public interest while also benefiting several significant regulatees. Furthermore, we consider measures that have been, and can be, taken to ensure high quality and credibility in water accounting standard-setting at national and international levels. We contend that the development of GPWA is unlikely to be dominated by a particular professional group given the multidisciplinary nature of the system. Section 4 contains brief commentary on the potential for GPWA to be adopted internationally and the likely regulatory outcomes and their effects if, indeed, it is. We conclude the paper in section 5 with a proposal for institutional arrangements to facilitate the role of GPWA internationally, if GPWA is to serve the public interest by providing high quality and credible information relevant to decisions affecting water resource planning, investment and allocation. We also propose avenues for future research.
Water management reforms
Until recently, each Australian jurisdiction [7] had its own particular approach to water management and reporting, with "no uniformity of language, structure, procedure or institutions" (Fisher, 2007, p. 115) nor data consistency (Bell and Quiggan, 2008) . For many years these inconsistencies presented few difficulties. However, with population growth, drought and climate change, increasing pressure on water resources has led to a range of reforms, including institutional reforms, that have been initiated since 1995 (McKay, 2005) . The problems have been particularly exacerbated by the fact that river systems cross State and Territory boundaries within Australia, and water distribution from those systems significantly disadvantage jurisdictions further from the source.
In 1992, the COAG agreed there was a need for reform of the water industry, resulting in a signed agreement in 1994. Further reforms culminated in the 2004 signing of a new agreement, the NWI, a plan for national water reform, by all the Australian governments [8] . This was a significant milestone that provided the impetus for the current Australian systems of water management and water accounting. Figure 1 provides a chronology of some of the most recent significant steps in Australia's water reform program, commencing from when the NWI was signed.
Subsequent to the signing of the NWI, an agenda was established to achieve a nationally compatible market, regulatory and planning based system of managing water resources that optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes. Furthermore, a National Water Commission (NWC) was established to assist with the NWI implementation. Key elements of the NWI include water resource accounting, best practice water pricing and water markets and trading (National Water Commission, 2008) .
With the express purpose of garnering public confidence in the management of water for economic, social and environmental purposes, the NWI requires the development and implementation of standards for systematically and consistently reporting information about water (Council of Australian Governments, 2004, para. 80-2) . "Water accounting" is the term that has been coined nationally for this system, which should produce reports to underpin water management, trading and policy development.
As a direct consequence of the NWI, Sinclair Knight Merz, an international engineering firm analysed Australia's existing water accounting practices to guide the development of standards and guidelines to underpin a national water accounting system. The report found that Australian water accounting was at "an immature phase [9] and being developed in an adhoc fashion" (Sinclair Knight Merz, 2006, p. 1) . Sinclair Knight Merz proposed the establishment of a Water Accounting Development Committee (WADC) to be the "prime decision making body for determining standards and guidelines" (Sinclair Knight Merz, 2006, p. 226 ).
Subsequently, the National Water Accounting Development project (NWADp) commenced at the direction of the Natural Resources Management Ministerial Council, and in 2007 the WADC was established to oversee this project. This committee was requested to begin the process to develop water accounting standards, develop a set of user information requirements and deliver demonstration water accounting reports. Presumably reflecting the formative nature of then-current thinking about the nature of water accounting, and also demonstrating political acumen, the WADC comprised a range of individuals with expertise ranging across irrigation, environmental protection, water management, water policy, hydrology, geology and financial accounting. The Committee was drawn from four states and one territory. Importantly, the Committee was supported by staff [10] with expertise in relation to water and who were managed by an individual with an accounting background.
The WADC recognised the potential for a new form of water accounting which could be developed by drawing upon an existing mature discipline. It also recognised the benefits of a sound conceptual underpinning to the system to be developed. Therefore, the WADC commissioned the development of a water accounting conceptual framework by financial accounting academics [11] . These academics modelled the GPWA conceptual framework on the international Conceptual Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements as it existed at the time (International Accounting Standards Board, 2001 (Crase and O'Keefe, 2009) . Amongst the key issues were inconsistencies between State and Territory reports on water flows, entitlements and allocations. Differences in reporting approaches meant that it was not possible to reconcile, for example, how much water one State reported as transferred to another, with the volume reported as having been received by the recipient State. In March 2008, the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water presented its report on the state of water reform. The report drew on contributions from Australian States and Territories as well as an updated assessment of the NWI prepared by the National Water Commission. In relation to GPWA, the report stated that there had been "strong national progress for delivery of water accounting objectives under the NWI" (Working Group on Climate Change and Water, 2008, p. 2). However, it acknowledged that the States would need to become more active in the roll-out of metering and accounting standards. The report proposed that the adoption of the national water accounting framework be accelerated.  issuing an annual National Water Account reporting on the nation's water resources and changes in those water resources;  developing Australian Water Accounting Standards for application by Australian water report entities; and  developing National Water Information Standards that govern the nature and quality of the data collected (e.g. water data measurement methods) (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, 2008) .
This allocation of responsibilities to the BOM is interesting given the BOM's previous independence from responsibility for water management or policy and its then general lack of skills in water accounting. However, it ensured the responsibility lay with a federal government body subject to high levels of public scrutiny and political accountability in relation to water.
The BOM's water accounting functions now include the compilation of water accounts for Australia as well as issuing National Water Information Standards and Australian Water Accounting Standards. As such, the organisation with potentially the most nationally significant role as a water accounting regulatee is also the water accounting regulator. Whether the BOM is an actual regulatee depends upon whether it applies reporting standards to its own reporting. Its draft pilot of the National Water Account preface states that the BOM is attempting to apply water accounting practices that accord with the GPWA conceptual framework and the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard (Bureau of Meteorology, 2010). However, that does not deny that the BOM can later choose another reporting approach, based upon an argument that the National Water Account is a specific purpose water account demanded by the Australian federal government, rather than a report whose preparation is governed by Australian Water Accounting Standards.
In November 2008, responsibility for the NWADp transferred to the BOM and the WADC became advisory to the BOM. In April 2009, having assumed responsibility for setting water accounting standards, the BOM changed the membership, title and terms of reference of the WADC. At the time of writing, the WASB is an independent advisory board to the BOM and has responsibility for overseeing and co-ordinating water accounting standards development. The members of the WASB are now selected according to water or accounting standardsetting expertise rather than any jurisdictional or stakeholder group affiliation.
Application of regulatory theories to national GPWA developments
Just as financial accounting standard-setting is politically influenced (Brown and Tarca, 2001; Collett et al., 2001; McLeay et al., 2000; Godfrey and Langfield-Smith, 2005) , GPWA developments have faced political challenges [17] and are likely to continue to do so. Also similar to financial accounting is the potential for GPWA standards to become international in nature. In this section of the paper we consider how changes in the Australian institutional arrangements for water accounting standard-setting may fit with particular theories of regulation. This, in turn, assists in predicting likely future pressures on water accounting standards development and assessing whether any action is required to ensure that GPWA serves its intended public service objective. We apply public interest, private interest, and regulatory capture theories of regulation and draw upon financial accounting development experiences to analyse the development of both financial reporting and GPWA institutional arrangements. While the focus is national, the implications are also international. Additional theories may be applied to predict GPWA standard-setting developments. However, we choose only public interest, private interest and regulatory capture theories to limit the scope of this study and because they have been applied successfully to explain developments in financial reporting, upon which GPWA is modelled.
According to theories of regulation, regulation is a public good that arises because of government intervention that can be subject to different economic and political forces. Stigler (1971) describes two main alternative views on regulation of industry. Public interest theory regards regulation as a means of protecting the public from market failure. In contrast, under private interest theory, government intervention is seen as the result of the political power of interest groups who seek outcomes which benefit them; it is the means for transferring wealth to well-organised groups. Consistent with this theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that, through its implications for wealth transfers and because of differing individual interests, government regulation creates incentives for lobbying on proposed accounting procedures. While it is often treated as a third theory of regulation, regulatory capture theory is a particular form of private interest theory. This theory assumes that although the purpose of regulation is to protect the public interest, this goal is not necessarily achieved because the regulatee controls or dominates the regulator and is able to assure that its private interest dominates the public interest.
Public interest theory
Typically, under public interest theory, regulation develops in response to a market failure crisis that is seen to be capable of resolution in the public interest. For example, government intervention in the financial accounting standard-setting process has been regarded as necessary because of failures in the market for accounting information. Similarly, the US Securities and Exchange Commission was established in 1934 following the 1929 stock market crash; likewise, the Sarbanes-Oxley reform bill on accounting and corporate governance was passed in 2002 following the corporate scandals such as the collapse of Enron and the WorldCom earnings manipulation (Ijiri, 2005) . In the UK, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales responded to criticism of the accounting profession, following what was regarded as misleading annual reporting, by establishing an Accounting Standards Steering Committee, later renamed the Accounting Standards Committee (Nobes and Parker, 2010) . In Australia, market issues blamed on poor accounting standards and low levels of compliance with accounting standards promulgated by the accounting profession led to establishment of the Accounting Standards Review Board in 1984 by the Australian Government [18] . This Board had the power to promulgate standards with the force of law. Similarly, world-wide calls for harmonisation of financial accounting to serve the public interest by increasing capital market efficiency, reducing the cost of capital for domestic firms listed internationally, and reducing the cost of national standardsetting resulted in the rise of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to its current global dominance of private sector standard-setting (Collett et al., 2001 ).
In Australia, Government initiation of the water accounting standard-setting process has been deemed necessary because of the critical importance of the resource during a (crisis) period of water scarcity, and because of issues related to water management. For example, some catchments have been heavily over-allocated to the point where the amount of water allocated for irrigation exceeds the sustainable capacity of the catchment (Bell and Quiggan, 2008) . More particularly, there has been a public and government crisis of confidence in the quality and consistency of information provided by different States and Territories (Fisher, 2007; Gardner and Bowmer, 2007; Connell et al., 2005) . Together with public concern for the environment and the integrity of water management by various jurisdictions, this has led to the series of reforms and developments, commencing with the NWI, that were described previously and summarised in Figure 1 . Consistent with this analysis, McKay and Marsden (2009) comment that the increasingly unsustainable exploitation of water in Australia has led to institutional and legal reforms. Grafton and Peterson (2007) also state that Australian governments are acutely aware of the water management challenge as water becomes increasingly scarce. "Australia's worsening scarcity problem […] demands that we deepen and accelerate reform" (Australian Government Department of the Environment and Water Resources, 2007, p. 17) . While the development of GPWA so far has occurred during a period of water scarcity, its usefulness does not necessarily diminish when decisions need to be made to plan for, or respond to, issues of water abundance.
Water accounting standard-setting can serve the public interest because formalised water accounting can increase the quality and credibility of information available to external parties, and also to internal managers [19] . Consequential decisions should affect resource transfers (e.g. via water flows, sale of water rights, investment in water infrastructure or investment in water utility stocks), economic growth, and other outcomes such as environmental protection. This is achieved by increasing the relevance, representational faithfulness and comparability of water information to users. "Standardised water accounting is important, because it lets us know how much water there is, where it is, who is using it, and what it's being used for" (National Water Commission, 2009, p. 8) . Public interest and public unrest gave rise to government intervention -to resolve a water shortage crisis and the crisis in confidence caused by failures in the market for information as States and Territories fought over the limited flows available from trans-border river systems and portrayed similar information differently under their different reporting approaches.
Even if GPWA serves short-term public interests, this does not mean that it will necessarily continue to serve the public interest. Nor does it mean that the institutional arrangements for setting GPWA standards will remain constant or suitable. The initial institutional arrangements for water accounting standard-setting were subject to intense debate. With data collection about water already a responsibility of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation also heavily involved in water research and data collection, not all shared the vision that water accounting would develop as it has, nor that the National Water Commission or the BOM should be the body responsible for driving the NWADp [20] .
The first phase of the reform of water accounting institutional arrangements took responsibility for water accounting away from the individual vested State and Territory jurisdictional interests and gave it to a specially-established body that worked closely with staff responsible for Australia's largest river system and basin, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority. This was possibly the best initial publicly and politically acceptable way to facilitate a public interest approach to setting water accounting standards. The acceptability came from two sources. The first is removal of the responsibility from individual jurisdictions that previously had been unable to develop a national, systematic and consistent approach to reporting water information of interest to policy makers, federal government, interest groups and the public. This constituted the market failure crisis that gave rise to calls for regulation in the public interest. The second is the allocation of responsibility to a Commission governing a multi-State and Territory catchment which was the subject of intense political concern and support because of a water scarcity and quality crisis affecting the catchment's economic, environmental, social and other effects on the majority of populated Australia.
However, this was not an enduring arrangement. Water accounting responsibility is now the purview of the BOM. Unlike the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, the BOM does not have responsibility for managing water. It could be seen to be a credible, independent body under strong, relevant government control because of its current reporting lines to the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities on matters relating to water information and lack of a vested interest in the outcomes of water management and other decisions based upon regulated water reports.
Having been charged in 2007 with responsibility for providing the first annual National Water Account, the BOM has fostered the development of GPWA and its application to the National Water Account. At the time of writing, two senior employees of the BOM observe and contribute to most meetings of the WASB or its committees. It remains to be seen whether the current arrangement where the BOM has responsibility for setting Australian Water Accounting Standards, setting National Water Information Standards governing matters such as the methods of metering and other approaches to quantifying water volumes or quality, obtaining water information from various entities, and then applying GPWA standards to National Water Accounts, is an effective governance model. The continual development of GPWA once the BOM has achieved its own main water accounting goal, namely the preparation of the first National Water Account, will test the BOM's resolve and the commitment of Government That said, more independent, authoritative and committed alternative governance/regulation models have not been proposed, and the BOM is taking its role seriously in a manner consistent with public interest theory.
Private interest theory
In contrast to public interest theory, private interest theory predicts that those parties who are likely to be adversely affected by legislation exert political influence and lobby for outcomes that benefit them. The decision to lobby on a proposed financial accounting standard depends on a lobbyist's cost/benefit assessment and ultimately the effect of the accounting change on their interests (Brown and Tarca, 2001 (Zeff, 2008) .
Applying private interest theory, those seeking to benefit from the BOM's control of water accounting standard-setting would lobby to influence the standard-setting process, if they considered that they stood to gain from lobbying. As Watts and Zimmerman (1979) explain, accounting procedures are a means of wealth transfer, and it follows that organisations expend resources to influence the accounting standard-setting process and secure a position that will enhance the organisation's wealth (or power or other private benefits) [21] .
As such, it is not surprising that the last four years have seen lobbying for groups such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics[22] to be responsible for water accounting standard-setting. The Australian Bureau of Statistics has produced water accounts aligned with the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for Water (SEEAW) for reporting the volume of water supplied and used in Australia since 1993. The Australian Bureau of Statistics can also be argued to have had a vested interest in promulgating the SEEAW approach rather than the development of a new system, as is occurring under the BOM's auspices. Other lobbyists include various jurisdictions, such as States or Territories, that have sought to maintain the systems they had in place before the national water project commenced.
It is important to note that public and private interests do not necessarily yield contradictory outcomes. For example, one benefit that has been foreshadowed as deriving from systematised GPWA is the rationalisation of water reporting requirements in a similar fashion to a company producing one set of accounts using IFRS rather than multiple sets of accounts for listings in different countries that have different accounting standards and reporting requirements. Unstructured interviews with members of the WASB indicate that a reduction in the requirements to report information about water to multiple authorities and interest groups is seen by jurisdictional water managers as one very positive potential outcome of national GPWA standards and publication of reports [23] . Having to provide only one report each reporting period will provide relief to those report preparers who previously were required to produce multiple reports to satisfy an array of regulatory reporting responsibilities. However, there is a risk that the GPWA reported information will become only a subset of the information that would best serve public interests because individual parties lobby for exclusion of some reporting requirements. If this occurs, wealth and other resource transfers to private interests can result.
The most obvious implication of private interest theory is that achieving "buy-in" from those required to produce GPWA reports is crucial to GPWA success. This buy-in might be achieved through involvement in water accounting standard-setting processes. For example, in the financial accounting standard-setting process, exposure drafts of proposed standards are issued for public comment with the intention of improving the final product and garnering support. However, there is potentially a trade-off between managing competing interests to achieve acceptance of the standards and having the standards achieve a general public good purpose.
There have been numerous opportunities, through the development of water accounting reform, to facilitate private interest endorsement. This is consistent with public interest theory, but also with public interest rhetoric and actions that cloak private interest regulatory motivation. The original WADC composition sought buy-in from most jurisdictions and interest groups with its broad cross-section of skills and interests and State and Territory representation. The current standard-setting process has sought jurisdiction support through pilot projects during different stages of development of the GPWA conceptual framework, the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard and ED AWAS 1. These pilot projects involve organisations whose different characteristics are likely to affect their technical application of GPWA and their acceptance of the approach. Public feedback has also been sought on the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard and its successor exposure draft. This will assist in the refinement and development of the first Australian Water Accounting Standard, which is expected to be published in 2012. In order to inform and educate parties with vested interests in the outcomes of water accounting standardsetting, in 2009 and 2010 the WASB also conducted a series of state and territory roundtable meetings with stakeholders likely to be affected by national GPWA standards. Similarly, Australian accounting and auditing and assurance standard-setting bodies have been kept informed and consulted regarding those aspects of water accounting standard-setting that are likely to concern them.
In the context of water accounting, it can be argued that the greatest evidence of private interest would be:
 individual jurisdictions lobbying for adoption of systems they already apply in order to minimize costs such as systems, development, implementation and training costs; and  private interests lobbying for reduced reporting requirements.
The first of these was very evident in the early stages of developing GPWA [24] . The States that had the most sophisticated jurisdictional systems in place were the most vocal lobbyists against the development of a national system that differs from theirs. These are also the States that have been subject to the most debate and criticism regarding overuse of water, and breaching of water allocation entitlements (Roberts, 2008) . The second has been evident in stakeholder roundtable meetings involving future GPWA report users and preparers and WASB members.
Regulatory capture theory
Regulatory capture theory is a specific form of private interest theory whereby the private interest that dominates is the interest of a party, or parties, whose behaviour is regulated. It assumes that although the stated purpose of regulation may be to protect the public interest, the regulatee is able to ensure that the their private interest dominates the public interest (Peltzman, 1976) . Regulatory capture is widespread and takes a variety of forms. Much evidence of regulatory capture has occurred in industries such as medicine, mining and finance. It has also been argued to be evident in the water sector, both in Australia and internationally [25] .
As an example of regulatory capture in the financial reporting domain, Walker (1987) asserts that the Australian Standards Review Board was captured by the interest groups it was established to regulate. The Australian Government originally established the Australian Standards Review Board as an independent body for protection of the public interest amid concern over low levels of compliance by accountants with the accountancy profession's standards. One role of this Board was to approve legally enforceable accounting standards that could originate from any source. However, Walker argues that the Australian Standards Review Board was successfully captured by the accounting profession, whose members were required to comply with the standards produced by the Board. In its short life of less than a decade, only one accounting standard was ever sourced from outside the accounting profession.
More globally and more recently, many have observed that the extractive industries captured the international accounting standard-setting process and secured favourable outcomes from the IASB. It has been contended that extractive industry influence has resulted in IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources achieving little in constraining varied accounting practice (Cortese et al., 2010) . Observations that the IASB's accounting standardsetting process has the potential to be captured by powerful interest groups are consistent with concerns about the pressure applied to the IASB in relation to amending IAS 39 during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Deloitte, 2008) . The outfall of the GFC provided a catalyst for accounting standards to be blamed for the crisis and lobbying by constituents resulted in the IASB changing IAS 39 to permit reclassifications of financial assets under certain circumstances, thereby aligning IAS 39 with US GAAP. In doing so, the IASB broke its consultation principles in allowing a particularly powerful private interest to influence its standard. Mary Schapiro, president of the Securities Exchange Commission, later cited this lack of freedom from political interference as a reason for the USA to delay IFRSs reporting (Veron, 2009 ). Subsequently, the IASB has decided to comprehensively revise IAS 39 in coordination with the FASB, rather than make piecemeal amendments.
While the FASB has agreed to work toward IFRS convergence, this provides significant incentives for it, as an effective regulatee, to capture the international standard-setting process. It is not surprising, then, that US dominance of membership representation on all four IASB committees has been suggested to compromise independence (Brown, 2008) .
Another means of influence is the provision of resources to the IASB (Wagenhofer, 2009 ). Financial resources provided by the extractive industries to the IASB have been argued to benefit those industries, for example (Noel et al., 2010) . Together, the arguments reflect a view that resources -human and financial -can influence the dynamics and outcomes of international accounting regulation. This is consistent with theories that regulatory networks influence accounting and auditing standards, and that these networks can be influenced significantly by regulated individuals and groups with particular agendas (Richardson, 2009) .
While the BOM is the Australian national water accounting regulator with responsibility for the development and issuing of water accounting standards, it is also a regulatee since the Water Act 2007 legislates that it must produce a National Water Account for Australia from 2010, and the BOM has stated its intention to apply GPWA in accordance with the Australian Water Accounting Standards when it does so (Bureau of Meteorology, 2010). Subsequent to passage of the Water Act 2007, the BOM no doubt has strong incentives, as a regulatee, to ensure that reporting requirements are not too onerous for it to apply in preparing the National Water Account. It simultaneously has incentives to ensure that standards are sufficiently specific and rigorous to guarantee that when the BOM directs the nature of information to be sourced from jurisdictions and other entities to prepare the National Water Account, the information will be suitable and of a high quality.
These apparently contradictory incentives, however, can be reconciled within the GPWA conceptual framework that underpins the development of future water accounting standards. This framework focuses upon the preparation and presentation of GPWA reports to provide information to users who do not have the ability to command the preparation of water accounting reports designed specifically for their needs. There is a legal requirement to provide a National Water Account, but the users of the National Water Account are not specified in the Water Act 2007. Hence, the BOM could argue that the water accounting requirements that regulate it relate to specific purpose water accounting reports, whereas the BOM regulates standards for general purpose water accounting reports. Mitigating any abuse of this semantic opportunity is the fact that blatant attempts to exploit the reporting requirement anomaly could instigate a take-over for water accounting standard-setting by either the accounting profession or the water industry sector.
Regulatory capture theory also suggests that the accounting profession has incentives to capture the standard-setting process since the profession could feasibly be required to prepare, audit and assure GPWA reports in the future. Even from a purely private interest theory perspective (rather than regulatory capture perspective), the accounting profession has incentives to lobby in relation to water accounting standards and to dominate their development. The financial gains from capturing the reporting and auditing and assurance requirements and ensuring that they are very closely aligned to those that already exist in relation to financial reporting could be significant. Given that water accounting draws upon financial accounting, water accounting skills and expertise could be acquired rapidly by members of the accounting profession to reap the reputational and financial benefits of industry specialisation by auditing firms (Craswell et al., 1995; Cahan et al., 2008) .
The national or international uptake of any water accounting system is likely to depend upon the system's effectiveness in providing useful information, and its feasibility as a system in the context of different countries' socio-political, legal, financial reporting and other information systems, and their capacity to collect and manage the required data. It is also likely to depend upon the potential to educate water report preparers and their information providers to build capacity for water accounting. In this regard, the accounting profession's engagement is vital to water sector buy-in and skilling in GPWA. It is likely to become a lucrative area for training and advisory services as well as for ongoing service provision by accountants with knowledge of water industries.
The AASB has been informed of the WADC's work and then of its successor, the WASB, from the time that the WADC was established. Acknowledging that there is potential overlap of the domain of the accounting and water accounting standard-setters, the AASB has maintained a watching brief. Furthermore, in 2011 the WASB will work closely with the (Australian) Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to produce ED AWAS 2, relating to the audit and assurance of GPWA reports. This cooperation recognises the interdependence of water-related, accounting and auditing disciplines in the preparation of GPWA reports. At the time of writing, while there is agreement that ED AWAS 2 should be prepared through co-operative efforts, it has not been determined whether the final product will be a standard of the WASB, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, or a joint standard.
The other industry sector with potential regulatory capture interests in dominating water accounting standard-setting is the water industry sector. Ultimately, the information that is sourced for water accounts is information that can best be acquired from those with in-depth water knowledge. Those in the water industries who provide water information to the BOM to prepare the National Water Account, and who are also likely to prepare GPWA reports have a vested interest in ensuring that they are not subject to onerous water accounting standards. On the other hand, those consulting to the water industries to apply their significant expertise in water measurement could well be motivated to ensure that water accounting standards are sufficiently complex and rigorous to increase the demand for their skills. As with the accounting industry, water industry professionals also have potential to earn professional kudos and revenues from training and advisory services. Thus, there are incentives for either class of professional to attempt to capture the process to ensure their revenue streams as well as their reputational status and ability to contribute significantly to the emerging water accounting discipline. The potential for one professional group to dominate the process is limited by the multidisciplinary nature of GPWA which requires knowledge of the water industry and understanding of accounting systems.
Regardless of discipline-specific interests, the fact that GPWA has developed in the absence of any universally accepted method of water accounting means that its standardisation and adoption are likely to proceed more smoothly than the globalisation of IFRS. This is because of the absence of vested interests in existing water accounting systems combined with the pre-existence of a GPWA conceptual framework.
In summary, there are several potential regulatees of GPWA standards. The BOM, as one potential regulatee, has incentives to produce standards that are directed to ensuring that entities reporting to it provide high quality and clearly prescribed information required by the BOM to produce the National Water Account. However, the BOM also has incentives to produce GPWA standards, that are not onerous it to implement. There are reputational and financial incentives for water-related disciplines to capture the process and ensure that the standards are technically challenging in ways that promote the kudos of the water-related disciplines and the role of water professionals in measuring, recording, reporting and auditing GPWA reports. If this occurs, much of the lessons from centuries of financial accounting practice potentially will not be brought to bear in developing standards, and the process is unlikely to be efficient. There are also reputational and financial incentives for the accounting profession to capture the process and adapt financial reporting and auditing and assurance standards to a water context. The accounting profession would be motivated to ensure that the standards were challenging in ways that promote the kudos of the accounting and auditing disciplines and the role of accounting professionals in recording, reporting and auditing GPWA reports. Presumably, this would involve focusing upon technical recording and communication issues rather than technical content regarding water, or confining technical content to a limited number of disclosures or notes. If this occurs, a lack of technical expertise in relation to water modelling and estimation, for example, could affect the potential to develop standards that are effective in communicating water information relevant to assessing water risks and thereby informing decision-making.
It is too early to know exactly how GPWA will evolve. However, there are very real opportunities for private interests, including those of regulatees, to play a part in that development, and also for regulatory theory to explain the likely outcomes.
International developments: a comment
There is international interest in GPWA. While other systems labelled "water accounting" exist, none matches the general purpose approach of the Australian system. For example, the SEEAW system developed by the United Nations reports statistics in a manner aligned to macro-level national accounts regarding balance of payments. This contrasts with the business-style reporting of transactions, transformations and events relating to a particular entity under GPWA. SEEAW's primary function is to provide data for analysis. Other systems trace water footprints: the movement of water, globally, as it is used in production and products are moved around the world (Hoekstra et al., 2009) . The International Water Management Institute has also developed a system to provide information on the supply and use of water and relate water use to the economy (Molden et al., 2001) . This system is similar to GPWA except that it does not account for water rights and obligations.
Trial preparations of GPWA reports in Africa and Europe have been driven by members of water-related industries in these continents, in conjunction with individuals involved in developing GPWA standards. Discussions with authorities in the European Union, at the World Meteorological Organisation, the United Nations, and a range of other significant international water management or water policy organisations indicate a strong interest in GPWA. Meanwhile, some members of the IASB have maintained an awareness of GPWA standards development. It is also noteworthy that financial accounting academics and water industry policy developers and advisers from around the globe met in Europe in 2010 to discuss the role that water accounting can play internationally. Their discussions are likely to underpin recommendations for the development of an institutional framework for the setting of international water accounting standards.
The greatest international interest in GPWA has been expressed by people involved in water policy development or water management; the accounting profession has maintained a more distant, watching brief. That was also true, nationally, during the early stages of Australia's GPWA development. The accounting profession subsequently became more influential by virtue of the need for both accounting and standard-setting expertise to contribute to the content and nature of the standards. Accounting firms have also recognised the potential to develop a new revenue stream should water accounting become more generally adopted. The role of the accounting profession will increase even further in Australia as a standard is developed in relation to the audit and assurance of GPWA reports. The expertise developed within Australian accounting firms would easily transfer internationally by virtue of the global nature of some of the large accounting firms.
Internationally, we posit that a similar sequencing of water industries' and the accounting profession's engagement in GPWA standard-setting is likely. Discussions in the international arena are currently concentrated amongst water industry professionals, policy advisers and managers. The accounting profession will almost certainly become more involved in a multidisciplinary approach as it becomes apparent that accounting skills are required to implement a water accounting system that parallels the (inter)national financial accounting system in significant ways. The accounting profession's involvement is likely to increase markedly as awareness increases of the opportunities to shape a system to which accountants will contribute and by which accountants may be regulated; and opportunities to generate revenues in a new niche accounting market.
What have not been established are the appropriate institutional arrangements given that, internationally, there many differences relating to water issues and their management; information systems quality; water management skills; and financial reporting skills. At a more political level, there exists a vast range of abilities to fund standard-setting; and to cooperate with other nations. Furthermore, some countries may have much to lose from transparent reporting of their water sourcing and use. As water accounting moves increasingly into the international domain, the politics relating to it will undoubtedly become significant.
Conclusion
The lessons learned from Australia's experience in developing GPWA are both national and international. A governance structure whereby the organisation responsible for developing water accounting standards is also responsible for implementing them and developing the related auditing and assurance framework works at present, but has yet to face serious challenge. Nationally, it will be interesting to see how GPWA standard-setting progresses once the BOM has produced its first audited National Water Account.
Competition between parties in water industries and accounting could force a water accounting standard-setting equilibrium that resides within either industry sector. Alternatively, the Australian federal government could create an independent organisation, with no requirements to report under water accounting standards, to take responsibility for water accounting. The status quo provides an example of regulatory capture that -at least in the initial stages -has also so far fitted well with the public interest theory of regulation. Sole water industry or sole accounting industry responsibility for setting water accounting standards would be an example of regulatory capture which risks losing the multidisciplinarity that is a strong positive feature of the current arrangements. These corner solutions may also disenfranchise the other industry regulatee to the detriment of the future of GPWA if it does not have bipartisan support.
Internationally, powerful players such as the EU and the FASB have demonstrated their influence over the IASB's standard-setting process. As the IASB's activities have become more far-reaching, political pressure has increased. Similarly, the water accounting standardsetting process in Australia, and internationally, has the potential to be influenced by powerful stakeholders with strong vested interests in the reporting and policy outcomes.
We are of the view that an organisation funded independently of either water or accounting interests and that draws upon skills from the water and financial accounting sectors but does not have responsibility also for the preparation of GPWA reports or their enforcement provides the greatest potential to serve the public interest. As long as it continues to describe the National Water Account as a specific purpose water account, the BOM can be argued to meet this description. An institutional framework for setting internationally accepted water accounting standards has yet to be developed. The politics surrounding this next step are significant, with national jurisdictional financial, property rights and political as well as disciplinary interests at stake. This paper describes GPWA national governance arrangements. Drawing from financial accounting experiences, it also provides an ex ante analysis of the potential for regulatory theories to explain future national and international developments and their repercussions. Future research opportunities include ex post analysis of the influences affecting GPWA development and governance. They also include assessing the implications of GPWA and its governance, during periods of both water scarcity and abundance, for reporting practices; the development of water modelling and measurement technology; and distributions of revenues between financial accounting and water-related disciplines. In combination, ex ante and ex post analyses can inform national and international institutional arrangements as they develop. They can also raise understanding of GPWA, its evolution and potential. In turn, this will affect the nature of the system and its ability to serve its general purpose decisionusefulness approach. Ultimately, resource allocations will be affected: both to the various parties involved in GPWA development, and by those parties using GPWA reports. www.bom.gov.au/water/standards/aboutWASB.shtml, Chalmers et al. (2009a, b) and Slattery (2008) . 2. The WASB has approved a conceptual framework that lists qualitative characteristics to ensure the usefulness of GPWA reports as relevance, faithful representation, completeness, neutrality, freedom from material error, comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009 ). 3. The definition of a water report entity for which GPWA reports should be prepared is "a water entity in respect of which it is reasonable to expect the existence of users who depend on general purpose water accounting reports for information about water, or rights or other claims to water, which will be useful to them for making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of resources" (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2010 Resource Management Ministerial Council with support from the National Water Commission. The Ministerial Council consists of the Australian and New Zealand government ministers responsible for primary industries, natural resources, environment and water policy. The National Water Commission is an independent statutory body, reporting directly to the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities. 9. While information on water resources has been compiled in Australia since the mid1960s (Vardon et al., 2007) , no single water accounting system has been applied consistently throughout Australia. 10. The Water Accounting Development Committee Office supported the WADC. The WASB is now supported by the Water Accounting Standards Board Office located within the BOM. 11. The academics who completed the draft water accounting conceptual framework are Professor Keryn Chalmers, Professor Jayne Godfrey and Associate Professor Brad Potter. 12. Unlike financial reporting, the conceptual framework underpinning GPWA includes concepts relating to measurement, disclosure, compliance and assurance. This conceptual framework also covers the objective of GPWA reports, qualitative characteristics of the reports, and the definition and recognition criteria for the elements of the reports that are analogous to the concepts covered in the financial reporting Framework (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009 If the BOM or its Director, were to be the beneficiary, their gain would be derived from: political profile, power and leverage associated with control over regulation relating to a high profile issue of critical national importance; access to the funding that the federal government allocated to water accounting standard-setting; or potential control over the standards which it chooses to apply, and which it enforces. 22. The Deputy Australian Statistician from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2005 was quoted as saying that water accounting is a high organisational priority and the Australian Bureau of Statistics could produce an annual report given greater resources (PALM Consulting Group, 2005, p. 3). 23. All interviews undertaken in this study are unstructured and occur as frequent discussions with WASB members and less frequent, but multiple discussions with managers of organisations that have piloted GPWA. They occurred over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The interviews were casual and unstructured in nature in order to develop rapport and to elicit information that might not be forthcoming in the context of structured interviews. 24. The academics who developed the water accounting conceptual framework and WASB members report that this behaviour was evident in focus group sessions and in meetings between members of the WASB and those involved in developing or applying existing jurisdictional approaches to water accounting. 25. See, for example, Herath's (2002) argument that the Franklin Dam in Tasmania was flooded for the purpose of electricity generation and Etzioni's (2009) discussion of mining companies successfully lobbying to dismantle restrictions on waste dumping in rivers.
